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RECENT CASES
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ANNEXATION-VALDITY OF COR-
RIDOR OR SnuP ANNEXATION-The city of Houston, Texas at-
tempted to annex by ordinance a 220 acre tract of land. Included
within the annexed territory was a strip of land 150 feet wide and
six and one-eighth miles long which connected the 220 acre tract
with the city limits of Houston. All of the land was within a strip
which had been specially annexed previously for limited purposes
but was not within the corporate limits of Houston. The trial court
granted the appellee a temporary injunction, finding that the land
was neither adjacent to the city nor within its territorial juris-
diction. The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding and
dissolved the injunction. It found that the ordinance providing for
annexation was not void since the city enacted it under constitu-
tional, statutory, and charter authority and because this authority
did not provide for any length, width, shape or amount of area
that a city might annex, a purely collateral attack was not permis-
sible. City of Houston v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 706
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
In the instant case the court determined that the stem or corridor
of land was adjacent and contiguous to the city limits in satisfaction
of the statutory requirement of contiguity of annexed territory.1
This decision is in accord with other Texas cases which have dealt
with the use of a narrow corridor connecting a larger tract with a
city's limits as a valid means of supplying the necessary con-
tiguity between the annexed territory and the annexing city.2 The
position of the Texas courts is that the use of a connecting stem to
reach annexed territory is not alone a sufficient reason to render
an annexation ordinance void because the statutes providing for
annexation do not define the specific shape or form of annexed
territory other than it must be contiguous."
Other states are divided with regard to the use of a corridor
as a valid means of providing contiguity between annexed terri-
tory and a city's corporate limits. Even states taking corresponding
1. City of Houston v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968).
2. See, e.g., City of Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 143 Tex. 45, 182 S.W.2d 695 (1944) ; State
ex reL city of West Orange v. City of Orange, 300 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
3. Id. Most states statutorily provide that annexed territory must be "adjacent" or
"contiguous" or both. See, N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-51.1-01 (1968): 2 E. McQUmLIn, MUNICI-
PAL CoRpoRAioNs § 7.20 at 361 (3rd ed. 1966).
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positions have arrived at them through various methods of reason-
ing. Since corridor annexation is a frequently used and often expedi-
ent method for the acquisition of additional territory, it would seem
necessary that a semblance of order be given to the law involved.
The courts of California have taken the position that corridor
annexation is valid, but with a slight variation from the approach
taken by Texas. The decision frequently cited by California courts
is the early case of People ex. rel. Peck v. City of Los Angeles.'
In this case the California Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the use of a corridor one-half mile in width and sixteen miles in
length. It reasoned that the shape of an annexed area was a political
and not a judicial question. The Court stated:
The size and shape of territory, its adaptability for
municipal purposes, its -extent and contiguity to another
municipality, are all matters which are left to be determined
by the people of the territory to be annexed and the an-
nexing municipality .... 5
The problem with a perfunctory finding of the validity of corridor
annexation because it is a political rather than a judicial question
is in the determination of the scope of the power which a legis-
lature intended to confer when it provided municipalitics with the
power of annexation. A later California case implied that there
definitely were limits to the use of corridor annexation and that
such annexation must be examined subjectively in order to determine
whether such limits had been exceeded. People v. Town of Corte
MaderaO emphasized that the courts will interfere where such an-
nexation amounts to a fraudulent abuse of powers conferred by
statute. Although this qualification may seem elementary and obvi-
ous, it is mentioned here because courts which look with disfavor
upon corridor annexation often invalidate its use on the ground
that the use of a corridor is always a fraudulent abuse of power.
Oklahoma takes a position similar to that of Texas and Cali-
fornia.' In Sharp v. Oklahoma City8  the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma determined that the statute regarding annexation did not
contain any limitation as to the extent, form, or shape of the
annexed territory and that such extent and shape is a political rather
than a judicial question. This case was relied on by an Oklahoma
federal district court in Botsford v. City of Norman in upholding the
4. 154 Cal. 220, 97 P. 311 (1908).
5. Id., 97 P. at 318.
6. 115 Cal. App.2d 32, 251 P.2d 988 (1952).
7. See, e.g., Town of Luther v. State, 425 P.2d 986 (Okla. 1967) ; Sharp v. Oklahoma
City, 181 Okla. 425, 74 P.2d 388 (1937).
8. 181 Okla. 425, 74 P.2d 883 (1937).
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validity of an annexation involving an angular strip 67 feet wide.9
Botsford was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit.0 The Court of Appeals recognized the political quality of
annexation in stating that the judicial function involved is the deter-
mination of whether a municipality has acted within its powers and
whether such act was reasonable.1 But with regard to the city's
use of a corridor, the Court chose to look no further than to find
that the corridor was contiguous, and that fact was sufficient to
satisfy the statute:
True, the 67 foot wide strip of land did extend for many
miles in an easterly direction away from the old city; never-
theless it was adjacent where it joined the eastern boundary
of the city and that connection is enough to meet the ad-
jacent requirements.
12
The New York case of Village of Sarnac Lake v. Gillespie"3
has often been cited as authority for the validity of corridor annexa-
tion in New York. However, in this case the city already owned
the annexed plot and the corridor was used for the municipal
purpose of connecting a sewage treatment plant with the city proper.
The court upheld the annexation in a summary opinion, so the
process of reasoning used to reach the decision is not known. For
these reasons it would not be prudent to assume that New York
has upheld corridor annexation as used in the context of this dis-
cussion.
Of those states which have found the corridor method of annexa-
tion invalid, Illinois is the most notable in terms of litigation.14 The
case which Illinois courts seem to accept as controlling in this area
is Wild v. People of Stephens.15 In this case a village annexed several
strips of land extending in various directions from its limits and
varying in width from 50 to 570 feet. One of the 50 foot strips
eventually attached to a larger parcel. The court refused to recog-
nize such a method of annexation, viewing it as ". . . a mere
subterfuge, and not a compliance with the law."1 6 The facts of
the case indicate that the method used was in fact a subterfuge;
the act was not reasonable. Yet this case and another equally as
9. 226 F.Supp. 258, 265 (W.D. Okla. 1964).
10. Botsford v. City of Norman, 354 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1965).
11. Id. at 494.
12. Id. at 4,94.
13. 261 App. Div. 854, 24 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1941).
14. People ex rel. Village of Worth v. Ihde, 23 1l1.2d 63, 177 N.E.2d 313 (1961) ; People
ex re. Adamowski V. Village of Streamwood, 15 Ill.2d 595, 155 N.E.2d 635 (1959) ; Village
of Morgan Park v. City of Chicago, 255 l. 190, 99 N.E. 388 (1912) ; Wild v. People ex rel.
Stephens, 227 Ill. 556, 81 N.E. 707 (1907) ; In re City of Springfield, 85 Ill. App.2d 191,
228 N.1_2d 755 (1967); People ex rel. Coojar Realty Corp. v. Village of Burr Ridge, 81
Ill. App.2d 203, 225 N.E.2d 39 (1967).
15. 227 Ill. 556, 81 N.E. 707 (1907).
16. Id.- 81 N.E. at 708.
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extreme! have been applied to invalidate subsequent corridor an-
nexation which, if looked at subjectively, could arguably be con-
sidered reasonable.
18
The use of a strip or corridor in the annexation of territory
seems to be viewed by some courts as inherently evil. 9 But the
emphasis should not be placed on the means used to annex; rather,
the court's inquiry should focus on the purposes sought to be
achieved by the annexation. The requirement that the territory
annexed be contiguous or adjacent to the corporate limits of the
annexing municipality has logical foundation. Where the municipal-
ity is completely separated from the annexed area, the municipal-
ity is without jurisdiction over the intervening territory and control
over this intervening land by another governmental subdivision be-
comes a possibility which would result in interference or termination
of governmental services and other municipal functions to the an-
nexed territory. However, where a municipality has annexed an
area in such a manner as to provide an uninterrupted junction of
the annexed territory with the corporate limits, the possibility of
severance is not involved. If this seems to be a reason for requiring
contiguity, then it would seem that the use of a corridor as a
means of providing necessary unity would accomplish such a pur-
pose. This statement must be qualified in that the corridor must be
capable of being utilized for the provision of municipal services to
the annexed territory. As an example, in State ex rel. Danielson
v. Village of Mound'5 a Minnesota municipality attempted to annex
an outlying area by including a five-eighths mile strip of railroad
right of way. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the use
of such right of way did not provide a means by which the annexed
territory could be "adapted to the maintenance of a village govern-
ment which can feasibly discharge its usual functions for the bene-
fit of all residents. ' 2' The Court did not condemn the use of cor-
ridor annexation as such, but only determined that it was not
adaptable for the effectation of municipal activities as it existed.
As the Court stated:
No motor vehicle or pedestrian can lawfully, safely, or as
17. People ex rel. Adamowski v. Village of Streamwood, 15 1l.2d 595, 155 N.E.2d 635
(1959).
18. People ex reL. Village of Worth v. Ihde, 23 fll.2d 63, 177 N.E.2d 313 (1961) ; In re
City of Springfield, 85 Ill. App.2d 191, 228 N.E.2d 755 (1967) ; People ex rel. Coojar Realty
Corp. v. Village of Burr Ridge, 81 Ill. App.2d 203, 225 N.E.2d 39 (1967). The annexed ter-
ritory In these cases shared community problems and interests with the annexing munici-
pality and was within one-half mile from the municipal limits.
19. see, e.g., People ex rel. Adamowski v. Village of Streamwood, 15 1l.2d 595, 155
N.E.2d 635 (1959). (The court stated that strip or corridor annexation had been con-
demned by the courts of Illinois and never been permitted by the legislature.) ; Watson v.
Doolittle, 10 Ohio App.2d 143, 226 N.E.3d 771 (1967).
20. 234 Minn. 531, 48 N.W.2d 855 (1951).
21. Id., 48 N.W.2d at 865.
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a practical matter, use the railroad right of way in passing
from the village to the annexed territory. In other words,
the area sought to be added does not by means of any usable
territory abut upon the village so as to permit travel to
and fro without passing over lands wholly outside the village.
. . . Likewise, the railroad right of way cannot reasonably
or feasibly be used in providing the new tract with the
usual village services by means of water, sewage, gas, and
electric connections. Policemen and firemen will be able
to discharge their duties only by traveling in part outside
their normal jurisdiction.2
2
Thus, it might be argued that if annexation in this case had been
by means of a corridor of functional utility to municipal activity,
the court could have found it valid.
In addition to determining whether a corridor is capable of
furthering municipal functions, such annexation should also be exam-
ined for the purpose of determining whether the territory sought
to be annexed by use of the corridor is properly subject to annexa-
tion. Basically, it should be shown that the annexed territory have
a community of interests with the municipality. 23 This necessarily
involves an examination of the particular facts of each annexation
of which the length of the corridor involved is only one factor. The
rate of growth of the municipality, the surrounding topography,
the use to which the land annexed is being put, the relative areas
and populations of the municipality and annexed territory, respect-
ively, and the proximity of other communities are additional and
perhaps more important factors. As an example, in Watson v.
Doolittle2 4 the village of Pioneer, Ohio, having a population of 900
and an area of 440 acres of which 160 acres was undeveloped farm-
land, sought to reach out by use of a corridor and annex an area
of 1,100 acres located approximately two and one-half miles from
the village limits. The court found this to be an illegal corridor
annexation. Judging from the tone of the court, the annexation
would not have been upheld even if it had been attempted under
more reasonable circumstances. The court did not focus on the
issue of the existence of a community of interests but rather focused
on the corridor itself. Here there obviously did not exist a com-
munity of interests which would qualify the territory for annexation.
But it is this that a court should be concerned with. If a community
of interests exists presently or is reasonably expected to develop
22. Id., 48 N.W.2d at 866.
23. Clark v. Holt, 218 Ark. 504, 237 S.W.2d 483 (1951); Hillman v. City of Pocatello,
74 Idaho 69, 256 P.2d 1072 (1953) ; State ex reL Danelson v. Village of Mound, 234 Minn.
531, 48 N.W.2d 855 (1951) ; 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 7.20 at 364, 369
(3rd ed. 1966).
24. 10 Ohio App.2d 143. 226 N.E.2d 771 (1967).
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in the near future as indicated by the present growth of the munici-
pality, then it would appear that the annexed area would be prop-
erly subject to municipal government. If such is found, the fact
that a corridor was used as a means of providing contiguity with
the municipality should not prevent a finding of validity of the an-
nexation.
An attempt to apply the "rule of reason" was the approach
used in the Wisconsin case of Town of Mt. Pleasant v. City of
Racine.25 But the court here concerned itself with the reasonable-
ness of the shape of the boundaries of the annexed territory and
concluded that the legal idea of a municipal corporation was that
of "oneness," consequently the use of a corridor was not considered
in keeping with the legal conception and could not be allowed. 26
The rule of reason should perhaps be applied to corridor annexa-
tion. However, the legal conception of a municipality as being a
collective entity should not be viewed from a strictly geographical
perspective, but rather from one that emphasizes unity of interest
between the annexed territory and the annexing municipality.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the determination of the
boundaries of a municipality is fundamentally a political question.
27
But the reasonable exercise of that power is a matter which the
courts are entitled to inquire into. The focal point of inquiry,
however, should be the relationship between the annexed territory
and the annexing municipality. The fact that a corridor was used
to connect the territory should not invalidate an annexation where
there appears to be a community of interests enabling the annexed
territory to be properly subject to the municipal government of the
annexing municipality. By the same logic, a municipality should not
be permitted to annex territory with which it does not share a
unity of interest merely by using a corridor to effect compliance
with the requirement of contiguity. But where a unity of interest
does exist, the court should examine the corridor involved only for
the purpose of determining whether it can adequately be utilized
in carrying out the usual functions of a municipality. If the require-
ments are met, corridor annexation should not be invalidated, even
though a better method might have been used.
ROBERT P. BRADY
25. 24 Wis.2d 41, 127 N.W.2d 757 (1964) (A strip 1,705 feet long and varying in width
from 306 feet to 152 feet was involved here.)
26. Id., 127 N.W.2d at 760. This case poses an interesting question with regard to leg-
Islative intent in that the court decided that the annexation was unreasonable after the
Wisconsin Annexation Review Commission pursuant to Wis. STAT. ANx. § 66.021 (11) (c)
(1965) determined that it was reasonable. See Johnson, The Wisconsin Experience With
State-Level Revieo of Municipal Incorporations, Consolidations, and Annexations, 1965 WIs.
L. REv. 462, 479.
27. The distinction between a truly political question and a Judicial question where the
use of a corridor is concerned is illuminated by the cases of Village of Inkster v. Board
of Supervisors, 363 Mich. 165, 108 N.W.2d 822 (1961) and Taylor v. Township of Dear-
